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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This

Appeal

Declaratory

is

from

Judgment

Plaintiffs,

The

jurisdiction

the Court's Memorandum

granting

Supreme

to hear

Court

Decision

Summary

Judgment

of

State

the

this Appeal under Utah

of

and

for

the

Utah

has

Code Ann-

§78-2-

2(3)(j) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)e(iii).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Board of State Lands upheld

an audit and demand

payment issued by the Division of State Lands.
filed

a

Declaratory

State

Land's

Motion

for

Judgment

decision.
Partial

The

Summary

action

The Plaintiffs

challenging

trial

court

Judgment

and

for

the

Board

of

granted

Plaintiffs'

entered

a

Judgment

reversing the decision of the Board of State Lands.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows:
(1)

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

entering

Summary

Judgment authorizing depletion of the trust asset for less than
full

value

in

view

of

Federal

and

State

constitutional

law

governing school trust lands?
(2)

Whether

the

plain

language

of

the

lease

may

be

rewritten by the court because one party claims it is ambiguous?
(3)

Whether

Plaintiffs

should

be

barred

from

using

the

doctrine of estoppel to avoid paying monies owed to the school
trust fund when it was Plaintiffs' duty to report and pay the
correct amount of royalties?
1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Enabling Act, §6:
That upon the admission of said State into the Union,
sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirtysix in every township of said proposed state, and where
such sections, or any parts thereof have been sold or
otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any
Act of Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in
legal subdivisions of not less than one quarter section
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of
which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said
State for the support of common schools....
Utah Enabling Act §10:
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for
educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise
provided, shall constitute a permanent school fund, the
interest of which only shall be expended for the
support of said schools, and such land shall not be
subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other
entry under the land laws of the United States, whether
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for
school purposes only.
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5:
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of
Congress, approved February 21st, 1855, for the
establishment of the University of Utah, and of all the
lands granted by an Act of Congress, approved July
16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent funds, to be
safely invested and held by the State; and the income
thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and
maintenance of the different institutions and colleges,
respectively, in accordance with the requirements and
conditions of said Acts of Congress. 91 (Article X was
amended, effective July 1, 1987 with Section 5 becoming
Sections 5 and 7 ) .
Utah Constitution, Article XX, §1:
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter
be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or
corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are
hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people,
2

to be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the
respective purposes for which they have been or may be
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-23:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental,
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it
may deem necessary in the interest of the state.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-76:
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by
the State Land Board shall before execution by such
board be approved as to form by the attorney general.
30 U.S.C. §207(a):
[A] lease shall require payment of a royalty in such
amount as the Secretary shall determine of not less
than 12 1/2 per centum of the value of coal as defined
by regulation, except the Secretary may determine a
lesser amount in the case of coal recovered by
underground mining operations....
43 C.F.R. §3473.3-2:
2.
A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not
less than 12 1/2% of the value of the coal removed from
a surface mine.
3.
A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not
less than 8% of the value of the coal removed from an
underground mine, except that the (Minerals Management
Service) may determine a lesser amount, but in no case
less than 5% if conditions warrant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Utah Division of State Lands audited the payments under
its coal leases on school trust lands.

One of those leases was

held by Plaintiffs, Consolidation Coal Company and The Pittsburg
& Midway Coal Mining Company.

Demand was made to Plaintiffs to
3

pay

royalties

found

by

the

audit

to

have

been

underpaid.

Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the auditors to the Board of
State Lands.

The Board, after a hearing, upheld the audit and

the demand for payment. (R.426, 430-447)

Plaintiffs then filed

this action in the Seventh Judicial District Court asking for a
declaration

that

royalties.

Plaintiffs

Judgment.
Summary
State.

the

State

could

filed

a

not

collect

Motion

for

the

Partial

unpaid
Summary

The trial court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial

Judgment
(Addenda

finding
1 and

that

2)

Plaintiffs

owed

nothing

to

the

It is from those Orders that this

appeal is taken.
The

United

States,

pursuant

to

the

Utah

Enabling

Act,

granted lands to the State of Utah to be used for the support of
the

common

schools.

The

State

holds

the

land

as

trustee.

Management of those lands is by the Board of State Lands and the
Division of State Lands.
On February

Utah Code Ann. §65-1-14.

16, 1960 the State issued to The Kemmer Coal

Company coal lease no. 25005. (Addendum 3)
extraction
County,

of

Utah.

produced
adjustment

in

coal
The

from

school

lease

commercial

at the end

is

trust

lands

perpetual,

quantities,

The lease authorizes

as

with

located
long
a

of each 20-year period.

as

in

Emery

coal

provision

is
for

The lease was

assigned to the Plaintiffs.
The United States Government owns most of the coal-producing
lands within the State of Utah; therefore, the royalty charged on
4

federal coal leases generally becomes the prevailing market
royalty rate for coal leases within the State• 1
no.

25005 was

issued

by

the

When State lease

State, the royalty

federal coal leases was $.15 per ton.

rate on many

The paragraph (Article III

Second) requiring the payment of royalty on the subject State
lease requires Lessees:
To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day
of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of $.15 per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases
issued by the United State at that time,
whichever is higher....
State
prepare

lease

and

statement

no.

forward

as to the

25005
to

the

amount

also
State,

requires
each

of production

the

quarter,

a

to

certified

together with

information as required by the State Land Board.
Third)

Plaintiffs

other

(Article III,

The State also retained the right to go upon the premises

and conduct audits of the lessees' records. (Article XI)
On August 4, 1976 the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of

1

Statement of Guy R. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the
Interior, to the Energy Resources and Materials Production
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources
"Oversight Hearing on the Federal Coal Leasing
Program," (June 12, 1980), wherein he testified: "Because the
vast Federal reserves and their locational advantage place the
government in a powerful market position, the Interior Department
will be the price setter for western coal."
5

1976, 30 U.S.C. §§201-209 was enacted by Congress.

The Act and

the

the

regulations

rate

on

surface

promulgated
mines

to

thereunder,
12

1/2%

of

increased
the

value

of

royalty
the

coal

produced and the royalty rate on underground mines to 8% of the
value of the coal produced.
1,

1986

(the audit

period)

Between January 1, 1979 and December
twenty-four

(24) coal

leases were

issued by the United States Bureau of Land Management on lands
within the State of Utah.

(R. 401-404)

Nineteen

(19) of those

leases required a royalty payment of 8% of the value of coal.
(R.401-404)

Only one required a royalty rate of less than 8% and

that royalty rate was 5% of the value of the coal.

The adjoining

States of Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico have all

increased

their royalty rate to at least 8% of gross sales value of the
coal extracted. (R.388, 391, 394)
In 1981 Plaintiffs
State lease 25005.
mineral

resource

decided

to start mining

operations on

Plaintiffs sent a letter to John Blake, a

specialist

for

the

Division

of State Lands,

informing him that mining operations would soon commence and that
Plaintiffs would be paying a royalty of $.175 per ton for the
coal. (R.204-213)

John Blake acknowledged receipt of the letter

and in accordance with the Division's practice sent Plaintiffs a
blank reporting form with which to report and pay its royalties.
(R.420-423)

The State did not express an opinion as to whether

$.175 per ton was the proper rate but rather relied on Plaintiffs
to pay the correct royalty rate. (R.420-423)
6

Plaintiffs never

requested

any direction

from the Board of State Lands or the

Director of the Division of State Lands as to what the royalty
rate should be (R.420-422, 426-431)
Consolidation

Coal

Company,

On July 1, 1983 Plaintiff,

entered

into

a

new

federal

coal

lease, No. U50044, located in Emery County which lease required
payment of royalties at 8% of the value of the coal. (R.401-404)
Plaintiffs did not increase its royalty rate at that time or at
any other time but continued

to pay royalties at the rate of

$.175 per ton.
The

lands

that

thousands of mineral

the

Division

leases.

funds or the personnel

of

State

Lands manages have

The Division

does not have the

to monitor

each

received on those leases. (R.426-427)

lease

or the

payments

Instead the State of Utah,

as written in its lease provisions and regulations, requires its
lessees to accurately provide information and to pay the correct
amounts of royalties. (Addendum 3)

Like reporting taxes, it has

largely been an honor reporting system.

In 1981 the Utah State

Legislature appropriated funds for the Division of State Lands to
hire an auditor to review income from its mineral leases. (R.426)
Richard

Mitchell

was

hired.

(R.397)

He

set

up

an

auditing

procedure and started to audit the State's oil and gas leases.
(R.397)

In

1984

the Auditing

Division was

expanded

and

two

auditors, Douglas E. Johnson and Ralph Aiello, were hired.
(R.406, 415)
In December of 1984 the auditors started to review the State
7

coal leases.
of

Land

Management

examination
records.

The audit included an analysis of the U.S. Bureau

of
The

records

the

on

Plaintiffs'

auditors

found

federal
and

that

coal

other
the

leases

State

coal

coal

lessees

and

an

lessee
had,

in

certain instances, under reported production and failed to report
other vital information.

They also found that the royalty rate

on federal coal leases had increased to 8% beginning in 1977 but
the Plaintiffs had

failed

to report and pay

royalties

at the

prevailing federal rate. (R.236, 406, 415)
An audit report was prepared and submitted to the Division
of State Lands.
State

Lands

auditors'

(R.401, 406)

establisned

report.

The

findings of the report.
and it was approved.

The Director of the Division of

an

audit

committee

committee

reviewed

to

the

review

lease

and

the
the

Some adjustments were made to the report

(R.401)

The report was then sent to the

Plaintiffs with a request for payment of the delinquent royalties
together with interest. (R.23 6)
The Plaintiffs, upon receipt of the audit report, requested
a hearing before the Board State Lands.
Board

rejected

the

appeal

and

A hearing was held.

upheld

the

findings

of

The
the

auditors. (R.426, 430-447)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is from the trial court's grant of a Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Summary Judgment is appropriate only when the

pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and admissions on file,
8

together with affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).

should consider the evidence in a light most

This Court

favorable to the

Defendants, Durham vs. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977),
and affirm the decision only if the Court determines there is no
genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact and that the
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
vs.

Holcombef

reviewing
court.

740 P.2d

281, 283

(Utah 1987).

Briqgs

This Court, in

the issues of law, gives no deference

to the trial

Atlas Corporation vs. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225,

229 (Utah 1987).
The

issues

before

the

Court

have

Plaintiffs by the Board of State Lands.

been

decided

against

This decision was prior

to Adkins vs. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah 1986)
which held that the hearing should have been before the Director
of the Division of State Lands.

The same lease provisions and

issues in three related cases which are on appeal to this Court
were decided

by

the

appeals and upheld
decision

of

the

Director who

the audit.

Director,

rejected

the coal

companies

The Court, when reviewing

should

not

override

the

the

Director's

interpretation of the Division's rules, policies and regulations
unless his decision is arbitrary or erroneous.

This Court should

only inquire as to whether the Director acted in excess of his
powers in upholding the audit.

McKnight vs. State Land Board,
9

381 P.2d

726, 731

(Utah 1963), Atlantic Richfield Company vs.

Hinkel, 432 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1970).
The Defendants agree that the controlling issues in the case
are issues of law.

The Defendants maintain that when the issues

of law are correctly decided they are entitled to judgment as a
matter

of

issues

of

law.
fact

Defendants maintain, however, that there are
in

dispute

judgment for the Plaintiffs.

which

preclude

entry

of

summary

Defendants request that this Court

review the legal issues, that those issues be decided in favor of
Defendants, and that the case be remanded with instructions to
enter judgment in favor of the Defendants.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The

State

of

Utah,

as

a

condition

of

statehood,

acquired certain lands in trust for the benefit of the common
schools.

The State has a Constitutional and moral duty to obtain

full value from the disposition of those lands.

The trial court

placed impermissible restrictions on the trust lands in question
when it restricted the royalty rate the State could collect from
those lands to $.175 per ton rather than allowing the State to
collect the contractually required market rate of 8% of value of
the coal.
2.

The royalty provision in the coal lease is clear and

should be given
Plaintiffs

its plain meaning.

periodically

determine

The requirement that the

whether

the

federal

royalty

rate has changed and that it pay royalties on the changed rate
10

does not create an ambiguity.

Such provisions are common in

long-term leases to insure that the parties pay according to
prevailing market terms.

In this case, a fluctuating royalty

rate is constitutionally required to insure that the trust fund
receives full value for its lands.
3.

The Court should use rules of construction to clarify

any ambiguity

in the lease.

The trial court erred when it

rewrote the parties' lease by limiting royalties to $.175 per
ton.

The

lease

subparagraph

should

be

construed

to

give

meaning

to

(b) of the royalty provision which provides for

periodic increases in the royalty rate.
4.

Estoppel should not be used by the Court to prevent the

trust fund from receiving full value for its assets.
Enabling

Act

requires

the

trust

to

receive

The Utah

full value and

requires the State to manage the trust fund in its governmental
capacity.

To allow estoppel in this case would violate those

constitutional

requirements and would cost the trust fund in

excess of two hundred thousand dollars.
5.

The Plaintiffs have suffered no injury, were aware of

the facts which caused the royalty rate to increase, and had the
duty to pay the correct royalties.

The State is only asking that

the Plaintiffs pay what is required by the lease.
should not be estopped.

11

Such a request

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
THE TRUST ASSETS OF THE STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS MAY
NOT BE DEPLETED FOR LESS THAN FULL VALUE.
The

State

lands which

are

subject

question are school trust lands.
and

the

other

issues

that

to the

coal

lease

in

The interpretation of the lease

were

before

the

trial

court

were

subject to rules of law established by the Utah Enabling Act,
Constitutional

provisions

and

case

law.

The

trial

court

erroneously rejected the law governing school trust lands in its
construction of the lease and in its holding that the State was
estopped from obtaining fair market value for its trust lands.
This argument will first set forth a brief historical background
on the purpose and policy of trust lands and will then examine
the

case

law

which

the

trial

court

should

have

applied

in

deciding this case.
A.
The Historical
Perspective.

Background

Provides

Essential

Utah is one of thirty (30) public land states whose Enabling
Act

granted

institutions.
1981].

lands to

be used

for the support of schools and

L. Mall, Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 [3 Ed.

In Utah vs. Kleepe, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978) rev'd

on other grounds 446 U.S. 500

(1980) the Court explained

purpose of the school land grants:
There were no federal lands within the borders of the
original thirteen states when they adopted and ratified
the United States Constitution. Thus, virtually all of
the lands within their borders were subject to
taxation, including taxation necessary for the
12

the

maintenance of their public school systems. When other
states were subsequently admitted into the Union, their
territorial
confines were
"carved" from federal
territories. The "public lands" owned and reserved by
the United States within those territorial confines
were not subject to taxation. This reservation by the
United States created serious impediment to the "public
land" states in relation to an adequate property tax
base necessary to permit these states to operate and
maintain essential government services, including the
public school systems. It was in recognition thereof,
i.e., in order to "equalize" the status of the newly
admitted states with that of the original thirteen
states, that the Congress enacted the federal land
grant statutes.
The specific purpose was to create a
binding permanent trust which would generate financial
aid to support the public school systems of the "public
land" states.
Id. at 758.
The Utah Enabling Act granted four (4) sections of land in
each

township

for

the

Enabling

Act

§6.

accepted

those lands

The

support
State

in trust

which they had been granted.

of
of

the

common

Utah,

in

schools.

its

Utah

Constitution,

for the respective purposes for

Constitution of Utah, Article XX.

B.
The Law Requires The Receipt Of Full Value From
The Disposition Of Trust Lands.
The school land grants constitute a solemn agreement between
the United States and the State of Utah.

There has been imposed

upon the State of Utah:
[a] binding and perpetual obligation to use the granted
lands for the support of public education. All revenue
from the sale or lease of the school grants was
impressed with a trust in favor of the public schools.
No State could divert school lands to other public
purposes without compensating the trust for the full
market value of the interest taken.
Andrus vs. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 523-524, 64 L.Ed.2d 458, 474, 100
Sup. Ct. 1803 (1981).
13

Beginning with the case of Trustees of Vincennes University
vs. State of Indiana, 55 U.S. 268, 274 (1852) the Supreme Court
of the United States has consistently held that a State holds
school lands in trust for the benefit of its schools.

Congress

and the Courts have placed restrictions on the use of the trust
lands so that they are not exploited

for private advantage or

depleted by State action or inaction.

Lassen vs. Arizona, 385

U.S.

458, 87 S.Ct.

584, 17 L.Ed.2d

515, 522

(1967).

(While

Lassen dealt with surface rights, recent cases make it clear that
these restrictions
school trust lands.

also apply to mineral

interests

located

in

Jensen vs. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32, 35 (Utah

1982), Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295,
96 S.Ct. 910, 47 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976).
The duty of the State, in managing mineral rights on trust
lands, is to obtain full value for the trust assets:
The royalty rate set by the state is important because
it represents payment for a trust asset which will be
gone forever once the mineral is removed from the
ground.
Therefore, the requirements of the Enabling
Act and the trust concept are the most important
factors to consider in determining an optimum royalty
rate.
If the rate is too low the state will be
committing a breach of trust by diminishing the trust.
Royalty payments are placed in a permanent trust fund,
the corpus of which is invested; the trust is kept
whole if fair market value is received. If the royalty
rate is too low the trust will not be kept whole.
3 State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates.
Land Law Review, 119, 130 (1982).

See also Kadish vs. Arizona

State Land Department, 747 P.2d 1183, 1195 (Ariz. 1987).
vs. Kleepe, supra at 758; State vs. University
14

Public

State

of Alaska, 624

P.2d 807, 813 (Alaska 1981).
To enforce this important trust purpose, the Courts have
consistently

rejected

any

State

statutes,

constitutional

provisions and Court-imposed doctrines which restrict the State
from obtaining full value from the trust lands.
Arizona

State

Land

Department,

supra, the

In Kadish vs.

Supreme

Court of

Arizona held unconstitutional an Arizona statute that fixed a
flat royalty rate for mineral leases on state school trust lands.
The court noted that federal law is supreme in this field and
that:
[n]either this court, nor the legislature, nor the
people may alter or amend the trust provisions
contained in the Enabling Act without congressional
approval.
Id. at 1185.

The court said that the Enabling Act intended to

severely circumscribe the power of state government to deal with
the assets of the common school fund.

It analyzed the court

cases dealing with this subject and pointed out that:
[t]he courts have consistently construed the scope of
federal land grants in favor of the government.
In
dealing with trust land ... all doubts must be resolved
in favor of protecting and preserving trust purposes.
Id. at 1195.
The primary case discussing the Utah Enabling Act is State
of Utah vs. Kleepe, supra.

That case dealt with the State's "in

lieu11 selections of additional lands to replace lands the State
had not received pursuant to the Enabling Act.

The Court, after

reviewing the Utah Enabling Act and the historical development of
15

trust lands, stated:
The school land grant and its acceptance by the state
constitutes a solemn compact between the United States
and the state for the benefit of the state's public
school system.
Id. at 758.
Recent
rejected
trust.

cases

attempts

from
to

other

limit

jurisdictions

the

income

have

received

consistently

by the school

In Anderson vs. Board of Education, 256 N.W.2d 318 (Neb.

1977) the Nebraska Supreme Court approved the resal.e of school
trust property after a higher upset bid was received after the
first sale.

It stated that the constitution:

imposes on the Board the duty of obtaining the highest
price possible for all trust property it may sell.
Id. at 321.
In Oklahoma Education Association vs. Nigh,
(Ok.

1981)

the

Supreme

Court

of

Oklahoma

struck

642 P.2d
down

a

230
law

authorizing low-interest loans to farmers from the funds of the
school trust fund.

In doing so the court said:

No disposition of such lands or funds can be made that
conflict either with the terms and purposes of the
grant in the Enabling Act or the provisions of the
Constitution relating to such land and funds.
The
State has an irrevocable duty, as Trustee, to manage
the trust estate for the exclusive benefit of the
beneficiaries, and return full value from the use and
disposition of the trust property.
Id. at 235.
In County

of Skamania

vs. Washington,

685 P.2d

576, 582

(Wash. 1984) a state statute which allowed purchasers of timber
from trust lands to default so as to avoid insolvency on the part
16

of timber purchases was held unconstitutional.
In Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295,
3 05

(197 6 ) , the federal government condemned school trust lands

including sections leased as grazing lands.
validity

of a school trust

Commenting on the

leasehold made

for less than

fair

value, the court considered a protective provision contained in
the New Mexico-Arizona

Enabling Act which provided against the

initial selling of lease rentals at less than fair value.

The

United States Supreme Court held that if the lease of trust lands
was for a rental of substantially less than the land's then fair
value, the lease was void.
The

Courts

consistently

hold

that

entities,

such

as the

Plaintiffs, are charged with knowledge of the trust and are also
subject to the duty to obtain full value for the trust.

State

vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193, 1199 (Ok. 1953),
State

vs.

Seward,

Lamacus, 263

133

NW.2d

390,

P.2d
391

426, 427
(Neb.

(Ok.

1965),

1953),

State

Seidel vs.

vs. Board

of

Educational Lands and Funds of Nebraska, 65 NW.2d 392, 397 (Neb.
1954) and Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948,
957 (Mont. 1985).
C.
Trust Land Law And Policy Should Be Applied To The
Facts Of This Case.
The State of Utah has the duty to receive full market value
from

the

disposition

of

its

school

trust

lands.

The

market

royalty rate on coal leases in the State of Utah is controlled by
the United States which has the vast majority of coal reserves.
17

Lessees

require

expenditures

long-term

involved.

It

leases
would

because

have

of

been

the

an

capital

impermissible

restriction on the trust assets if the State would have set a
flat rate per ton royalty on its long term coal leases.
vs. Arizona State Land Department, supra at 1195.

Kadish

It is equally

impermissible for the court to judicially set the royalty rate at
a set amount per ton.

The State therefore, drafted an escalator

clause in its coal lease which tied the royalty provision to the
prevailing federal rate.
State

would,

throughout

That escalator clause insured that the
the

term

of

the

lease,

receive

full

market value.
The
provide

State, also
for

payments.
receives

implemented

interest
Those

full

and

penalties

provisions

market

rules

value;

further

and
on

regulations
delinquent

insure

otherwise,

the

depleted as a result of the time value of money.

that
trust

which
royalty

the

trust

would

be

Bjork vs. April

Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977).
The

Plaintiffs,

as

a

party

pursuant to the terms of the
correct amount of royalty.

dealing

with

the

trust

and

lease, had the duty to pay the

When an audit was performed by the

State it showed that the Plaintiffs owed to the trust fund in
excess of two hundred thousand dollars. (R.236)

The trial court,

by refusing to enforce the escalator provision of the lease, by
refusing

to

require

the

payment

of

interest

on

delinquent

royalties, and by amending the lease to limit royalties to $.175
18

per ton imposed constitutionally impermissible restrictions on
the trust fund.

That decision, in this case, costs the trust

fund, as of the audit, $197,193.04 with an ongoing loss of
approximately $2.00 per ton for coal produced after the audit.
The contract created by the trial court runs directly counter to
the law and public policy of this State.

Thus, the court below

is in the anomalous position of having written a contract which
violates "the generally accepted doctrine of this country that
every contract in violation of law is void."
60 Utah 38, 44, 206 P.2d 533, 555 (1922).

Baker vs. Latses,

See also, Haddock vs.

Salt Lake City, 23 Utah 52, 65 P. 491 (1901) (holding void as
against public policy a contract to pay fees for service of legal
processes where the fees set in the contract were different from
the

fees

set

by

statute);

Boise-Payette

Lumber

Company vs.

Challis Independent School District, No. 1 of Custer County, 4 6
Id. 403, 268 P. 26 (1928) (holding that judicial determinations
of public policy must recognize and yield

to any applicable

legislative enactments).
The instant case should be reversed and remanded to the
trial

court

with

instructions

that

the

escalator

clause be

enforced and that the trust fund receive royalty rates at the
prevailing market rate of 8% of the value of the coal removed
together with interest as provided by the regulations.
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POINT II. THE ESCALATION CLAUSE RELATING TO ROYALTIES
IS CLEAR; THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE PLAINTIFFS DETERMINE
THE PREVAILING FEDERAL ROYALTY RATE DOES NOT MAKE THE
CLAUSE AMBIGUOUS.
The Court, as a matter of law, is to give the provisions of
a contract their plain meaning as ascertained from the instrument
itself.

The Court should look to the entire instrument and give

meaning to all provisions.

Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P.2d

1060, 1061 (Utah 1981), Hal Taylor Associates vs. Union America,
Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982).

The trial court erred when

it ignored the plain meaning of the royalty provision and the
intent of the parties when entering into the contract and rewrote
the lease deleting the escalator provision of the royalty clause.
A reading of the royalty provision in the lease (Article III
Second) shows that it is clear and complies with the intent of
the parties that the trust lands receive the going royalty rate.
It states that the royalty rate will be $.15 per ton (which was
the federal rate when the lease was signed) or if the prevailing
federal

rate increases

on similar lands then the royalty rate

increases to that new rate.

The trial court was apparently under

the misconception that because the escalator clause required the
Plaintiffs to determine the prevailing rate from facts outside
the

lease

that

somehow

an

ambiguity

was

created.

Such

a

provision is not defective if there is a formula or method to set
the price.

Ferris vs. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 359 (Utah 1979).

Escalator
provisions.

clauses

in

long-term

mineral

leases

are common

Almost all escalator clauses or "favored nation"
20

clauses require the parties to ascertain a fluctuating rate from
facts outside the body of the lease.

See e.g. Energy Reserves

Group, Inc., vs. Kansas Power and Light Company, 459 U.S. 400,
417

(1983),

Amoco

Production

Company

vs.

Stauffer

Chemical

Company of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463, 468 (Wyo. 1980), Lonestar Gas
Company vs. The Howard Corporation, 556 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Tx.
1977) .

The ascertaining of facts outside the lease, to put into

effect

the

lease

provisions,

does

not

create

an ambiguity.

Instead, such provisions are drafted to insure that rates, such
as royalty rates, are tied to the market price thereby protecting
both parties during the term of the lease.
The royalty provision contained in the contract provides a
formula for fixing the payment price.

Subsection

(b) of the

provision states that the royalty payment to be paid by the
Plaintiffs are determined by the prevailing federal rate on lands
of similar character under coal leases issued by the federal
government.

Plaintiffs had the duty to determine any change in

the federal royalty rate.

The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments

Act of 1976 increased the royalty rate to 8% of the value of the
coal produced on federal coal leases.

The federal government

owns the majority of coal reserves in Utah.

Since 1979, 19 of 24

coal leases issued by the federal government in the State require
a royalty payment of 8% of value.

In addition, the adjoining

states of Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico have increased the
royalty rate to at least 8% of the value of coal produced under
21

their leases.

Plaintiffs hold numerous federal leases in Utah,

part of which require an 8% royalty.

Those facts when applied to

the royalty provision require that a royalty rate of 8% of value
be paid to the trust fund.
The plain meaning of the provision is that the royalty rate
to be paid by the Plaintiffs would change when the federal
royalty rate increased.

The Plaintiffs do not argue that $.175

is the prevailing federal rate for federal leases of land of
similar character and concede that the federal rate has increased
since the lease was signed.

Plaintiffs, to avoid paying the

correct royalty, instead tries to claim the lease is ambiguous.
A reading of the plain language of the lease, coupled with the
law governing trust lands, and the change in federal royalty
rates

support

only

one

construction

of

the

lease.

That

construction is that the prevailing federal rate on underground
coal leases has increased to 8% of value and that Plaintiffs must
pay royalties at that rate to provide full value to the trust.
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POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED THE LAW
REGARDING TRUST LANDS, THE ESCALATOR PROVISIONS OF THE
LEASE, AND THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AND IMPOSED A
FLAT $.175 PER TON ROYALTY RATE.
A.
Any Ambiguous Provision Should Be Resolved By
Rules Of Construction Instead Of Being Deleted From The
Lease.
If the Court determines there is an ambiguity in the lease
then the

Court

should

apply

certain

rules of construction

interpret or clarify the ambiguous provision.
not delete or rewrite the contract.
are:

(1)

the

intent

of

the

to

The Court should

Those rules of construction

parties

when

entering

into

the

contract controls the meaning of the contract, Utah Valley Bank
vs. Tanner, supra at 1061; (2) existing law which affects the
provision

is considered

part

of the

contract

and governs

its

construction, Robinson vs. Joint School District, 596 P. 2d 436,
438

(Ida.

1979),

Farmers

Investment

Company

vs.

Pima

Mining

Company, 523 P.2d 487, 489

(Az. 1974); (3) consideration should

be

matter,

given

contract

to
and

Fontainbleu,

the

subject

the
405

motives

P.2d

of

the

346, 348

nature

and

parties,

(Utah

1965);

purpose
Nagle

of

vs.

the
Club

(4) the contract

should be viewed from the perspective of the parties at the time
it was signed, DeBouis vs. Nigh, 584 P. 2d 823, 824 (Utah 1978);
(5) the court should give the entire contract meaning and not
ignore

any

of the provisions

of the contract

or rewrite

the

contract, Hal Taylor Associates vs. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d
743,

749

(Utah 1982);

and

(6) the contract must be

construed

liberally to protect the public interest, Public Service Company
23

vs.

Denver,

387

P.2d

33,

36

(Colo.

1963),

Restatement

of

Contracts 2d §207.
If these rules of construction are applied to the royalty
provision, the interpretation given by the State is the correct
and reasonable one.
royalty
fund.

The State, as trustee, is required to have a

provision which provides a maximum value to the trust
A royalty rate that would fluctuate as market conditions

changed is required.

To have set a flat royalty rate would have

been unconstitutional.
supra at 1195.
reserves
charged
market

in
by

The Federal Government owns the majority of coal

the
the

rate

Kadish vs. Arizona State Land Department,

State
Federal

in

the

of

Utah;

therefore,

Government

State

of

the

constitutes

Utah.

At

the

royalty

the

rate

prevailing

time

the

lease

provision was drafted the federal royalty rate was generally $.15
per ton.
minimum
clause

The royalty provision, therefore, was drafted setting a
royalty
tied

to

of
the

$.15

per

ton, but

prevailing

providing

federal

an

royalty

escalator

rate.

The

escalator clause was required by law and the obvious intent of
the parties when the contract was entered into was to provide a
mechanism whereby the State would always receive the going market
royalty

rate

information

from

its

trust

and construction

lands.

When

to the undisputed

one

ties

facts

that

it shows

that the federal royalty rate was generally $.10 to $.175 per ton
until 1976.

At that time the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act

was passed and as a result the royalty rate on federal leases was
24

increased to 8%,

The undisputed facts show that from 1979 to the

present all newly issued federal leases in Utah, except for one,
were at the rate of 8% or greater.

The Director of State Lands

has properly construed the State coal lease to require payment of
royalties at 8%.
B.
The Plaintiffs Have Never Contended That
Royalty Should Always Remain At $.15 Per Ton.
One

of

the

things

that

is

certain

about

The

the

royalty

provision, in addition to the plain meaning of subsection (b), is
that the contracting parties intended that the royalty rate would
change if federal royalty rates increased.
the

Court

should

look

at past

practices

determine the meaning

of the royalty

misconstrue

practices

the

past

Plaintiffs argue that

of

practices actually support the audit.

of the parties to

provision.

the

Plaintiffs

parties.

The

past

The past practices show

that when Plaintiffs decided to start mining in 1981 they knew
that

subparagraph

(b)

of

the

royalty

provision

applied.

Plaintiffs therefore sent the State a letter stating that it
would be paying royalties at $.175 per ton which was the rate
Plaintiffs paid on a federal lease in the area.

Plaintiffs did

not inform the State of the 8% rates being paid on new federal
leases being issued in the area.

The State relied on Plaintiffs,

as provided in the lease, to properly report and pay royalties.
The State therefore acknowledged receipt of Plaintiffs May 19,
1981

letter

royalties.

and

sent

Plaintiffs

blank

forms

to

report

its

The State's letter did not express a position as to
25

whether the rate proposed by Plaintiffs was accurate.

In 198 3

Plaintiffs acquired a new federal lease in the area (U50044)
which required a royalty rate of 8%.

Plaintiffs did not notify

the State of its new lease nor did Plaintiffs increase their
royalty payments to 8%.
Plaintiffs do not argue that $.15 or $.175 is the prevailing
federal rate for federal leases on land of similar character
under coal leases issued by the United States during the time
period covered by the audit.
has increased and subparagraph
Plaintiffs

do

not

like

the

They have conceded that the rate
(b) applies.
higher

rate,

However, because
Plaintiffs

claim

ambiguity and that they should be allowed to continue to pay at
$.175 per ton.

This has nothing to do with the intent of either

party at the time of the execution of the lease.

Indeed, that

so-called interpretation flatly contradicts the parties' intent
at

the

time

it was

signed.

In

this

particular

case the

undisputed facts establish that the prevailing federal rate is 8%
of

value

which

is

the

rate

Plaintiffs

government on most of its other leases.

pay

to

the

federal

Any changes in the rate

can be easily determined by review of Bureau of Land Management
records.
C.
State Statutes Prohibit The Amending Of The Lease
Without The Land Board's Approval.
There is a difference between construing a provision and
ignoring it.

To ignore and not enforce subparagraph (b) of the

royalty provision of the lease constitutes a rewriting of the
26

terms

of

the

lease

without

the

necessary

approval

Director, the Land Board or the Attorney General.

of

the

Morgan vs.

Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976).

Utah Code

Ann. §65-1-76 requires:
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by
the State Land Board shall before execution by such
board be approved as to form by the attorney general.
§65-1-23 Utah Code Ann., requires:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental,
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it
may deem necessary in the interest of the state.
The

trial

court

should

rewrite the parties' lease.

not be

allowed

to

unilaterally

If there is an ambiguity, the trial

court should be directed to apply proper rules of construction to
clarify the ambiguity and give meaning to all of the royalty
provisions.
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POINT IV.

ESTOPPEL IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THIS CASE.

The traditional rule is that the doctrine of estoppel cannot
be asserted

against a state government

in matters

affecting

public policy, public revenues or when the state is acting in its
governmental capacity.

Estoppel is not applied in matters where

an action is prohibited by a state statute or is the result of
unauthorized acts of State officials.

Atlantic Richfield Company

vs. Hinkel, 432 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1970).
There

are

many

safeguarding public

good

reasons

for

this

rule

including

funds and interests which are subject to

changes in political opinions and changes in public officials and
employees.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d

715, 718 (Utah 1982) .

Restrictions on the application of legal

doctrines when public lands are involved is common such as in the
area

of

eminent

possession.

domain, Utah

Code Ann.

§78-34-3

or adverse

There are even greater restrictions and protections

when trust funds and trust lands are involved because of the
constitutional requirements and important policies.
The trial court's ruling that the State was estopped from
enforcing the royalty provisions of the lease was wrong for the
following reasons: (a) the important policies and law governing
trust lands prohibits the use of estoppel when the doctrine is
used to diminish the income received by the trust fund; (b) the
State acts in its governmental capacity when managing trust lands
and is subject to estoppel in only limited circumstances; and (c)
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the undisputed facts will not support a finding of estoppel.
A.
The Important Policy Of Receiving Full Value For
The Trust Fund Prohibits The Use Of Estoppel.
The trial court erred when it concluded that Defendants were
estopped as a matter of law from enforcing the terms of the lease
and obtaining full value for the trust fund.
considered whether

estoppel

should

Courts which have

be applied

when

it would

reduce the income to school trust lands have consistently held
that the important public policy of providing full value to the
trust

lands

prohibits

the

imposition

of

a defense

such as

estoppel.
In State vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193 (Ok.
1953) the clerk for the State failed to reserve minerals when
issuing

a certificate

allowing

reformation

rights

to the

of purchase
of

the

State, held

for land.

documents
that

the

The Court, in

restoring
State

was

the mineral
acting

in a

governmental capacity and that it would be a violation of the
State's

trust

responsibilities

mineral rights.

to

allow

divestiture

of

the

Furthermore, the court said that the purchaser

is charged with notice that the State is acting as a trustee and
is

charged

with

notice

that

the

State

could

only

act

in

compliance with rules and regulations of its position as trustee.
The Court held that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to
those acts which were beyond the authority of the State employee
when he issued the deed and failed to reserve the mineral rights.
Id. at 1199.

The State employee in this case had no authority,
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either intentionally or accidentally, to set a royalty rate lower
than the prevailing federal rate.
In

State

vs. Northwest

Maqnesite

Company,

182

P.2d

643

(Wash. 1947) the Commissioner of public lands promised the lessee
of school trust lands that the lessee could remit royalties on
the basis of net profits.

That representation was contrary to

the statute and the lease.

The Court, in holding that the lessee

was required to pay royalties in accordance with the terms of the
lease, held that the State was acting in a governmental capacity,
that estoppel could not be used to enforce the promise of the
Commissioner of Public Lands, that Defendant's payment of money
did not constitute an estoppel, and that the State was entitled
to interest on the unpaid royalties.

Id. at 662.

In the case of Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702
P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985), Defendants claimed that they were entitled
to

certain

water

rights.

The

Montana

Supreme

Court

denied

Defendants' claim and found that the water rights were part of
the school trust lands of the State of Montana.

The Court held

that there were three important principals governing school trust
lands.

Those principals were:

(1) the Enabling Act created a

trust which the State could not violate; (2) the Enabling Act was
to be strictly construed according to fiduciary principles; and
(3) the Enabling Act pre-empted State laws and constitutions.

It

further held that Courts are to be very protective of the trust
and emphatic of the need to preserve the value of the trust
30

corpus•

The Court also found that an interest in State land

cannot be conveyed without adequate compensation and that any use
or management which would devalue State lands is impermissible.
It said that anyone who acquires an interest in trust lands does
so subject to the trust and that trust lands are subject to a
different set of rules than other public lands.

Xd. at 956.

The holdings in the above cases are consistent with the
manner in which this Court has decided issues involving estoppel
against the State.

The general rule in Utah is that an estoppel

cannot be applied against the State if to do so would violate
State statute.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company,

supra at 719.

In the case at hand, the application of an

estoppel would be a violation of both State statutes and the
Constitution of Utah.

Even if the Court determines that estoppel

could apply, the Plaintiffs must prove that estoppel is necessary
to prevent manifest injustice and the public interest would not
be unduly damaged by imposing the defense. Utah State University
vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982), Celebrity
Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689, 694
(Utah 1979).

In Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company the

Court stated:
[t]he rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel
against the government is sound and generally should be
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as
hereinabove stated, where the interest of justice
mandates an exception to the general rule. In cases
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is
whether it appears that the facts may be found with
sufficient certainty, and the injustice to be suffered
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is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.
Id. at 720.
The essential policy and public interest in trust land cases
is the requirement that the trust fund receive full value for its
assets.

To allow the application of estoppel in this case would

defeat that purpose.

As pointed out in Utah State University vs.

Sutro and Company and Celebrity Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor
Control Commission the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied
when it would violate such an important public purpose.

See

also, Western Kane County Service District vs. Jackson Cattle
Company, 744 P.2d

1376, 1378

based on estoppel and stating

(Utah 1987)

(reversing a ruling

fl

[w]e are extremely reluctant to

apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in
a public highway by a governmental entity").
In addition, there is no manifest injustice involved.

An

assertion of manifest injustice requires the Plaintiffs to prove
with certainty that paying royalties at $.17 5 per ton is a higher
purpose than that of the trust fund receiving full value for its
assets.
718.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, supra at

The injustice in this case is the trial court's application

of estoppel giving the Plaintiffs a windfall at the expense of
the school trust fund.
B.
Estoppel Is Applicable Only In Very
Circumstances When The State Is Acting
Governmental Capacity.

Limited
In Its

The question of whether the State of Utah acted in its
32

governmental or proprietary capacity when managing school trust
lands was considered by the Utah Supreme Court in Duchesne County
vs. State Tax Commission, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943).

This Court

held:
Here the trusteeship of the fund was vested in the
State by the Enabling Act as a condition of statehood,
as a condition to the right of the State to be born,
and imposed upon the State at its birth by the
instrument of its creation as a condition of its life
as a government.
It must therefore be held by the
state in a governmental capacity.
Id. at 343.
This ruling is in line with rulings in other states which
have considered the issue as well as the present case law of the
State

of

functions

Utah
and

regarding

the distinction

governmental

retains its immunity.

functions

between

proprietary

as to which

the

State

A governmental function has been defined

as a function which is performed only by a government entity and
is essential to the core of governmental activity.

Cox vs. Utah

Land and Mortgage Corporation, 716 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1986),
Metropolitan Financial Company vs. State, 714 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah
198 6) .
definition

The

Utah

to

Legislature

include

governmental activities.

has

non-essential

recently

expanded

as

as

well

that

essential

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a).

The

management of school trust lands is an obligation imposed upon
the

State

by

Constitution.

a

federal

statute

and

accepted

by

the

Utah

It is an activity that can only be performed by

the State.
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As

already

established,

the

Court

must

be

extremely

reluctant to apply estoppel when the State is acting in its
governmental capacity.

When public lands are involved, still

more restrictive rules govern.

For example, adverse possession

cannot be applied against public lands.
P.2d 697, 698 (Utah 1934).

Peterson vs. Johnson, 34

Great protection is given to trust

lands because doctrines such as estoppel or adverse possession
defeat constitutional requirements to receive full value for the
trust and violate the State's governmental powers.

Department of

State Lands vs. Pettibone, supra at 952.
It is hard to imagine any other act of the State which would
be more governmental in nature than the trust responsibilities
imposed bv the Enabling Act and accepted by the State in its
Constitution and as a requirement to obtain statehood.

Estoppel

cannot be used to prevent the State from functioning in this
important government capacity.
C.
Estoppel Would Prohibit The State From Correcting
Errors Found Through The Audit Process.
The audit, by the State, of Plaintiffs' records showed that
in addition to underreporting the royalty rate Plaintiffs also
did

not

report

the

production

of

1,389.42

tons.

(R.618)

Plaintiffs do not claim the State is estopped from collecting for
that

production

objection,

even

inaccurate

quarters involved.

through
quarterly

the

State

accepted,

without

reports and payments

for the

Where is the line between what Plaintiffs

claim is subject to estoppel and that which is not subject to
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estoppel?
One of the problems with asserting the doctrine of estoppel,
in a case such as this, is that it is of no value for the State
to audit its lessees.

When the Plaintiffs or any other lessee,

holding a State lease, reports an incorrect royalty rate, an
incorrect sales price, incorrect production or any other factor
going into the calculation of the royalty those errors are only
discovered when an audit is made.

If the State has to make an

audit each time a payment comes in and determine immediately the
accuracy of each report, the public interest will be severely
damaged.

It is impossible for the State to audit each report

when it is received.

Therefore, the lease and State procedure

requires the lessee to accurately report and pay royalties.

The

State then conducts periodic audits to insure compliance.
D.
The Undisputed Facts Do Not Support A Finding Of
Estoppel.
The trial court erred when it concluded that the State was
estopped

from

collecting

delinquent

royalty

payments.

Its

finding that the Plaintiffs had relied on the State's lack of
protest and had mined the coal in reliance upon a royalty rate of
$.175 per ton was wrong.

The facts upon which reliance and

detriment

be

could

Defendants.

correctly

founded

were

disputed

by

the

Indeed, the undisputed facts showed that it was the

State that relied on the Plaintiffs to pay the correct royalty
amount.

The Plaintiffs had the duty to the State to calculate

and pay the correct royalty.

Plaintiffs concede they are liable
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for failure to report all their production of the lease.

The

State did not have a duty to Plaintiffs to collect the correct
royalty although it has such a duty to the school trust.
If the doctrine of estoppel were applicable in this case the
Plaintiffs must prove: (1) a false representation or concealment
of a material fact; (2) made with knowledge of the facts; (3)
made to a party without knowledge or the means of knowledge of
the

real

facts;

(4)

made

with

the

intention

that

the

representation be acted upon; and (5) the parties to whom the
representation was made, relied or acted upon is injured.

Colman

vs. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah 1987).
One is not entitled to rely on erroneous or unauthorized
statements of a government employee.

Dansie vs. Murray City, 560

P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1977), Atlantic Richfield vs. Hickel, supra
at 591.

If a person has the means to determine the actual facts

estoppel does not apply.

Morgan vs. Board of State Lands, supra.

To claim estoppel against the government, the injury must be
substantial.
injury.
PSC,

Paying what is owed under the lease is not an

Barnes vs. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1988); Williams vs.

754

P.2d

41

(Utah

1988);

and

Utah

Department

of

Transportation vs. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 P.2d 270
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The undisputed facts will not support a finding of estoppel.
It was the Plaintiffs who was responsible to correctly report the
royalty rate and payments.

It was the Plaintiffs who had coal
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leases with the federal government and who were aware of the
increase in the federal royalty rate (R.37 6, 401) and it was the
State that relied on the Plaintiffs to accurately report and
accurately pay the correct royalty amount. (R.42 6)

It is the

Plaintiffs that have conceded liability of failure to correctly
report production but somehow claim they have no liability for
incorrectly reporting the royalty rate. (R.618)

The undisputed

facts support a finding of estoppel against the Plaintiffs and
not in favor of the Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs claimed that there were certain representations
made by John Blake, Mineral Resource Specialist, that the royalty
rate was $.175 per ton.

The State denies there was any agreement

as to the royalty rate.

The State sent Plaintiffs a blank

reporting form and relied on Plaintiffs to correctly report the
rate as it changed. (R.420)

Plaintiffs admit there was not a

decision by the Director or the Board of State Lands regarding
what was a correct rate to be paid by Plaintiffs.
in issue the State was silent.

On the matter

Silence by the State will not

support estoppel, especially when the State did not know the
facts but was relying on the Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs also claim

they would have not mined the State coal lease if the royalty
rate had been increased and allege that they will incur a loss if
required to pay the increased royalty rate.

During the time

period in question, Plaintiffs were entering into leases with the
Federal Government for adjacent lands and was paying 8% royalties
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on that lease. (R.376, 401)

Plaintiffs will only be required to

pay what the lease requires.

Such does not constitute injury.

Barnes vs. Wood, supra, Williams vs. PSC, supra.

If this Court

determines that the doctrine of estoppel could apply in this
case, then the matter should be remanded to the trial court for
trial with Plaintiffs having the burden to prove it has met the
elements required for estoppel.
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CONCLUSION
The law requires that the State of Utah receive a maximum
return on its disposition of school trust lands.

The State

implemented that requirement by linking the royalty rate on the
lease to the prevailing federal royalty rate.

The decision of

the trial court imposes improper restrictions on the trust lands.
The State asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial
court and remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in
favor of the State of Utah upholding the decision of the Director
of State Lands.
Respectfully submitted this /(^day of/September, 1988.
NIELSEN / SENIOR
Attorne/s/ for Appellant

UL£L

By:

C l a ^ k ^ T Allrecl
By: AJ*k>o3vO^AX\AU^
Gayle rf\ McKeachnie
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ADDENDUM

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY,
THE PITTSBURG & MIDWAY COAL
MINING COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

I
]1

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]
!

THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,
Defendants.

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]1
]
]

Civil No. 4779

]

The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from
the Court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should
be construed in light of the parties course of performance;
that the lease is not self-executing so as to place a legal
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher rate of royalty after
the State accepted without qualification the payment of the
stated rate of $.17^ per ton of coal produced; that the
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped

from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally
enforced.
The defendants have objected to the granting of the
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary Judgment
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiffs to pay the
delinquent royalty payment as determined on the basis of 8% of
gross sales value during the audit period; ordering that the
plaintiffs owe interest on delinquent royalty payments at a
rate set by the Board of State Lands and, further, ordering
that the plaintiffs owe penalties on delinquent royalties
pursuant to the regulation set by the Board.
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on
the Motions as hereinafter stated.
-2-

Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part,
agreed upon by the parties as setforth in their respective
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of
those undisputed facts except as necessary for the disposition.
of these motions.

It is undisputed that the plaintiffs came

into ownership of a coal lease on State lands in approximately
1978; that the lease was on the standard form provided by and
prepared by the State Land Board, and provided for royalty as
follows:
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter,
royalty
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of
land of similar character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,
whichever is higher. . . ."
During 1978, plaintiffs1 employees contacted Mr.
Blake of the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry
regarding the required royalty payment.

At that time, the

plaintiffs were told that because of some confusion in the
application of the royalty provision, they could not commence
mining until an agreement was reached on the royalty rate.
That thereafter, an agreement was reached to the effect that
the royalty rate would be 15c

a ton for coal mined, which was

the same rate as that charged on a Federal Lease held by the

No mining was performed by the plaintiffs on the
property until 1981.

Prior to commencing mining, the

plaintiffs1 employees attempted to confirm the royalty rate
with the Division of State Lands and Forestry by again
contacting Mr. Blake of the Department of Natural Resources.
Mr. Blake informed the plaintiffs that the rate of royalty
would be 17%c per ton, which was the same rate as the royalty
on an adjacent Federal mining lease held by the plaintiffs, and
Mr. Blake further stated that the rate was subject to
readjustment at the end of its 20 year term in 1983.
The plaintiffs proceeded to mine coal under the
Stare Lease beginning in the third quarter of 1981 and
continuing through June of 1983.

The plaintiffs again

commenced mining on the property in February of 1985 and has
continued to the present.
The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has
two columns.

One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed

Percentage Basis.

Plaintiffs filled in the column entitled c/T

Basis and paid the amount of royalty shown to be due under that
column at 17^c per ton and left the other column blank.
During the period of mining, the plaintiffs reported
and paid the royalty to the State at the rate of 17^c per ton
on the form provided without objection or comment by the
-4-

defendants.

In October of 1985, the plaintiffs made a demand

upon the plaintiffs for delinquent royalty, interest and
penalties in the sum of $197,193.09 contending that the royalty
payments should have been 8% of value of coal mined during the
audit period based upon the Federal Lease Amendments Act and
regulations promulgated thereunder, and the Federal Leases
which have been issued in the State of Utah since 1979.
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of
the State, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of
the lease is ambiguous.
Subparagraph (b) leaves the amount due based on
several factors not immediately capable of definitive
determination.

The ambiguity arises as much from what is not

stated and provided as from what is stated.

In other words, at

the beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing
federal rate and who makes that determination, the lessor or
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is
it prevalent?

Who makes the determination that the land in the

State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in
-5-

character and what is the basis for determining similarity?
What time period is used to determine federal leases "issued...
at that time" and who makes that determination?

Even if a

prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to the
"value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal regulation
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in
his assessment, and who makes that determination?
For these reasons, the Court has concluded that
sub-paragraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal
obligation on the lessee since r.he identifiable factors
necessary for self-execution coi.ld not independently be
ascertained by either party.
Sub-paragraph (b) was written by the State for its
benefit and since it is not self-executing, it would require
some affirmitive action on their part to bring the provision of
that sub-paragraph into an enforceable position other than a
retroactive audit after having accepted 17%c per ton from the
beginning of mining until the last of 1985, without objection
or comment.
Under these circumstances, the Court must look to
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the
provisions of sub-paragraph (b), and to calculate the royalty
at the rate of 17^c per ton.
-6-

Since the State by an established course of conduct
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that
provided for 17^c a ton, they are now precluded from asserting
a different construction of the Lease where they took no
sufficient or positive action to establish their now asserted
construction to an ambiguous lease provision.
Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further
ground for what the Courtfs final conclusion and ruling will
be, the Court will address other issues presented.
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual.
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon
the 8% of value figure.

The undisputed facts show that the

State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of
Article III of their own Lease and were made aware by the
quarterly payments submitted by plaintiffs that those
provisions were being ignored by leaving that reporting column
blank and by accepting, throughout the auditing period, without
-7-

question or objection, royalty based upon like

a ton.

If the

provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were going to be implemented,
the State had a duty to speak which they did not do.

By their

conduct and failure to perform this duty, they induced
plaintiffs to believe that 11h$ a ton was the acceptable
royalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon, continued to mine
coal under the Lease which they would not have done had they
known that the defendants were going to insist upon the 8% of
value provision.

The great injustice that would result to

plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants to assert this
position, is quite obvious since the record shows that to allow
the imposition of u,he greater royalty, the plaintiffs would
show a substantial loss on all mining activity under the State
Lease.
Even if the conclusion is reached that the defendants
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be
estopped from asserting the new royalty rate.

No substantial

adverse effect on public policy will result if the defendants
are estopped from applying this newly determined royalty
retroactively.

The State can still proceed to lease coal lands

on any terms it feels profitable and that will give the State
the maximum return.

They still have the power to revise the

wording of their coal leases to do away with any ambiguity and
to carry out any legally established policy.
-8-

The Court further finds that the State had no right
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent
payments at the legal rate, or any penalty.

A legally binding

lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations
adopted subsequently.
The Lease does state that it is subject to such
operating rules and regulations as nay be hereafter approved
and adopted.

Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean

changes to or additions of monetary payment.

"Operating Rules"

has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical
interpretation.

Since the amount claimed by the State is not

subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be
due could not commence to run until demand is made.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for
and denies defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this ^>T^-

day of February, 1988.

^^^^OYD^JSNNELL,

D^S^rict Judge" /

KEITH E. TAYLOR (A3201)
PATRICIA J. WINMILL (A3523)
LUCY B. JENKINS (A2973)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utan 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY;
THE PITTSBURG & MIDWAY COAL
MINING, CO.,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR THE UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES,

Civil No. 4779

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

This cause came on for hearing on cross motions for
summary judgment on February 16, 1988.

It appearing to the Court

that plaintiffs are entitled to Declaratory Judgment as a matter
of law on the uncontroverted material facts of record, the Court
having heretofore entered its Memorandum Decision on Motions for

Summary Judgment on February

24, 1988, and good and sufficient

cause appearing therefore,
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.
tiffs

royalty

interest

Defendants are not entitled to recover from plainpayments

relating

of

to tons

more
of

than

coal

17-1/2

reported

cents
by

per

ton

plaintiffs

or
for

which royalty payments were made at 17-1/2 cents per ton under
the provisions of State Lease No, 25005 prior to the readjustment
of the terms thereof at the end of its 20 year term in January of
1988.
2.

This

Summary

Judgment

reserves,

and

does

not

resolve, any remaining disoute between the parties regarding the
amount of coal mined in State Lease No. 25005 by plaintiffs.
3.

The parties hereto shall bear their own respective

costs and attorneys1 fees.
DONE IN OPEN COUR^ this ^ ?

-*>-

da,y of March, 1988.

Proof read:

VS CP

APPLICATION NO.

MINERAL LEASE NO.
25J03

GRANT:

4 » rC

^

School
Wornal School

120.00 acres
40.00 •'

UTAH STATE LEASE FOR
COAL
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE AND AGREEMENT entered into in duplicate this
?->rrj
day of
^nn.ry
, 19 ^P, by and between the STATE U N D BOARD, acting in
behalf of the State of Utah, hereinafter called the Lessor, and
TiiE REHIRE* COAL COMPANY
Frontier, UyoHng

party of the aecond part, hereinafter called the Lessee, under and Puriuant to Title 65,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
WITNESSETH:
That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be paid and the covenants to be observed the Lessee, as hereinafter set forth, does hereby grant and lease to
the Lessee the exclusive right and privilege to mine, remove, and dispose of all of the
said minerals in, upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in
Ercry
County, State of Utah, to-wit:
Northwest Quarter (WWk) of Northeast
South Half (Si) of Southwest Quarter
Southeast Quarter (SEV) of Southeast
Twenty-two (22) South, Range Six (6)

Quarccr (N?i) of Section Twenty (20j .
(SV-i) of Section Twenty-nine
(jjj»
Quarter (SZ^) of Section Thirty (30), Township
East, Salt La^e Keridian,
"

containing a total of
160.00
acres, more or less, together with the right to use
and occupy so much of the surface of said land as may be required for all pruposes reasonably incident to the mining, removal, and disposal of said minerals, according to the
provisions of this lease, for the period ending ten years after the first day of the month
next succeeding the date hereof and as long thereafter as said minerals may be produced in
coamercial quantities from said lands, or Lessee shall continue to make the payments required
by Article III hereof, upon condition that at the end of each twenty (20) year period
succeeding the first day of the year in which this lease is issued, such readjustment of
terms and conditions may be made as the Lessor may determine to be necessary in the interest
of the State.
ARTICLE

I

This lease is granted subject in all respects to and under the conditions of the laws
of the State of Utah and existing rules and regulations and such operating rules and
regulations as may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State Land Board.
ARTICLE II
This lease covers only the mining, removal, and disposal of the minerals specified m
this lease, but the Lessee shall promptly notify the Lessor of the discovery of any minerals
excepting those enumerated herein.
ARTICLE 111
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights and privileges aforesaid,
hereby covenants and ;agrees as follows:
FIRST:
To pay to the Lessor as rental for the land covered by this lease the sum of
fifty (50) cents per acre per annum. All such annual payments of rental shall be made in
advance on the first day of the month following the anniversary date of each year, except
the first year rental which is payable on application for this lease. All rentals shall be
credited against royalties for the year in which they accrue.
SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding
each quarter, royalty
(a)

at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal produced from the leased
premises and sold or otherwise disposed of, or
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(b)

at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which payment
is being made, for federal l e ^ e a s of land of similar character under
coal leases issued by the United Sta:es at that time,

whichever is higher, and, commencing with the year beginning the January 1, following two
years from the date hereof, to pay annual royalty of at least $1.00 multiplied by the
number of acres hereby leased regardless of actual production, provided that Lesser may,
at any time after the tenth anniversary date hereof, increase the minimum annual royalty by
not to exceed 507..
If the coal produced from the leased premises is washed before sale or other disposition by Lessee, Lessee may pay royalty on the washed product only, provided Lessee maintain
accurate record by which the weight of washed coal originating from the leased premises can
be ascertained and complies with all regulations and directives issued by Lessor to prevent
waste and to insure that royalty is paid on all washed coal originating from the leased
premises.
THIRD:
To prepare and forward to the State Land Office, on or before the 15th day of
the month next succeeding the quarter in which the material is produced, a certified statement of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of fror. said land
and such other additional information as the State Land Board may from time to time require
FOURTH: To keep at the mine office clear, accurate and detailed maps on tracing cloth
on a scale not more than 50 feet to the inch, of the workings in each section of the leased
lands and on the lands adjacent, said maps tc be coordinated with reference to a public lam
corner so that they can be readily and correctly superimposed, and to furnish to the Lessor
annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such maps and such written statements of
operations as may be called for. All surveys shall be made by a licensed engineer arvi all
maps certified to by him.
FIFTH:
Not to fence or otherwise- ma'<e inaccessible to stock any watering place on
the precises without first obtaining the written consent of Lessor, nor to permi' or contribute to the pollution of any surface of subsurface water available or capable of being
made available for domestic or irrigation vs«-.
SIXTH:
Not to assign this lease or any interest therein, nor sublet anv pert ion of
the leased premises, or any oi the rights aT,d privileges herein granted, withejt the
written consent of the Lessor being first had and obtained.
ARTICLE

IV

The Lessor hereby excepts and reserves from the operation of this lease:
FIRST:
The right to permit for joint o: several use such easenents or rights-of-way
upon, through, or in the land hereby leased as may be necessary or appropriate tc the
working of these or other lands belonging tc or administered by the Lessor containing
mineral deposits or for other use.
SECOND: The right to use, lease, sill, or otherwise dispose of the surface of said
lands or any part thereof, under existing State laws or laws hereafter enacted, insofar as
said surface is not necessary for the Lessee in the mining, removal, or disposal of the
leased substances therein, and to lease mineral deposits, other than those leased hereby,
which say be contained in said lands so long as the recovery of such deposits does not unreasonably interfere with Lessee's rights herein granted.
ARTICLE

V

Upon failure or refusal of the Lessee to accept the readjustment of terms and condition
demanded by the Lessor at the end of any twenty-year period, puch failure or refusal snail
work a forfeiture of the lease and the same shall be cancelled.
ARTICLE VI
In case of expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of this lease, all
underground timbering supports, shaft linings, rails, and other installations necessary for
the support of underground workings of any mines, and all rails or head frames and all insta
ations which cannot be removed without permanent injury to the premises and all construction
and equipment installed underground to provide ventilation for any mines, upon or in the sai
lands shall be and remain a part of the realty and shall revert* to the Lessor without fur the
consideration or compensation and shall be left by the Lessee in the lands.
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All personal property of Lessee located within or upon the said lands, and all buildings, machinery, equipment and tools (other than the installations to become the property
of Lessor as above provided), shall be and remain the property of Lessee and Lessee shall
be entitled to, and may, within six (6) months after such expiration, forfeiture, surrender
or other termination of said lease, or within such extension of time as may be granted by
Lessor, remove from the said lands such personal property and improvements, other than
those items which are to remain the property of the Lessor as above provided.
Lessee shall, upon termination, of this lease or abandonment of the leased premise
for any reason, seal to Lessor's satisfaction all or such part of the mine openings on the
premises as Lessor shall request be sealed.
ARTICLE VII
It shall be the responsibility of the Lessee to slope the sides of all operations of
a surface nature to an angle of not less than 45° or to erect a barrier around such operation MB the State Land Board may require
Such sloping or fencing shall become a normal
part of the operation of the lease so a« to Keep pace with such operation to the extent
that such operation shall not constitute a hazard.
ARTICLE VIII
Lessee shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any water rights acquired for u^e upon
the leased premises except with Lessor's written permission
Upon termination of this lease
for anv reason, all such rights acquired by application to the Utah State Engineer shall
revert to the Lessor as an appurtenance to the leased premises, and all such n g ^ s acquired
by other means shall be offered to Lessor in writing for pjrehase at Lessee's acouisition
costs, provided that Lessor shall be deeded to have rejected such offer if it does not accept
the same within thirty davs after receipt thereof.
ARTICLE IX
All of the terms, covenants, condition^ and obligations in this lease contained, shall
be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of the Lessee
ARTICLE X
L e s s e e ma\ s u r r e n d e r
the leased lands, but n o t
of a l l r e n t a l s , r o y a l t i e s
written relinquishment.
i t y on the d a t e of filing
Lessor.

t h i s l e a s e for c a n c e l l a t i o n b^, Lessor as t o a l l or a^v p a r t of
l e s s t h a n a q u a r t e r - q u a r t e r s e c t i o n or surveyed l o t , upon pavraent
and o t h e r amounts due L e s s e r anc by f i l i n g w i t h t h e Lessor a
The r e l i n q u i s h m e n t s h a l l be e f f e c t i v e as t o f u t u r e r e n t a l l i a b i l such r e l i n q u i s h m e n t , but o t h e r w i s e on t h e d a t e of c a n c e l l a t i o n by

ARTICLE XI
Lessor, its officers and agents, shall ha*e the right at all times to go in and upon
the leased lands and premises, during the term of said lease to inspect the work done and
the progress thereof on said lands and the products obtained therefrom, and to post any
notices on the said lands that it may deem fit and proper, and also shall permit any
authorized representatives of the Lessor to examine all books and records pertaining to
operations under this lease, and to make copies of and extracts from the same, if desired
ARTICLE XII
This lease is issued only under such title as the State of Utah may now hold, and that
in the vent the State is hereafter divested of such title, the Lessor shall not be liable
for any damages sustained by the Lessee, nor shall the Lessee be entitled to or clair any
refund of rentals or ro>alties or other monies theretofore paid to the Lessor
ARTICLE XIII
If the Lessee shall initiate or establish any water right on the lease premises, such
right, shall become an appurtenance of the leased premises, and, upon the termination of
the lease, the Lessee shall convey the right to the Lessor.
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ARTICLE XIV
Said lease and this agreement are made upon the condition that Lessee shall perform
•11 the covenants and agreements herein set forth to be performed by it, and if at any time
there shall be any default on the part of Lessee hereunder, and if such default shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days after written notice of such default being given by
Lessor to Lessee, then and in such event said lease and this agreement shall, at the option
of Lessor, be terminated by written notice to Lessee and the demised premises shall revert
to Lessor.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto subscribed their names the day and year
first above written.
STATE OF UTAH
STATE LAND BOARD

BY ( ^ r . / 6 - V X
Director

Attest:

7r~~^>^

Lessor

THE K£34KgRg£ COAL COMPANY
—j

-

Presicent

Secretary

Lessee
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the
^^_____
to me thai

)
:
)

ss.
day of

, 1967, personally appeared before me
, the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged
, executed the same.

Given under my hand and seal this

day of

, 19

.

My Commission Expires:
Notary Public, residing at:
WYOMING
STATE OF jtfASc

)
ss

COUNTY OF L I N C O L N )
On the
day of
March
t 19 68 f personally appeared be fere ne
G. E , S O R E N S E N
who being duly swern did say that he is an officer cf
TH£ KJLMHLKJLK I U A L l u W P S N Y
and that said instrument wa; signed in
behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Board of Direstors, and said
C. E . S O R E N S E N
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the sane.
Given under my hand and seal this

day of

, 19

.

My commission expires:
Notary Public, residing a::
Frontier, Wyoming
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
^
^
On the
day of
*•*•' - ' li"*->
, 19 , personally appeared before r_e,
Charles R. Hansen, who being by me duly sworn did say that he is the Director of the Scate
Land Board of the State of Utah and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said 5oard,
and said Charles R. Hansen acknowledged to me that said Board executed the sare in behalf of
the State of Utah.
Given under my hand and seal this
My commission expires:

APR 1 0 i3b3

day of

19

s «£•Public, residing at;

Notary
Salt Lake City, Utah

/

STATE OF WYOMING
COUNTY OF LINCOLN

)
:
)

SS.

On the// -^ day of March, 1968, personally appeared
before me G. E. SORENSEN, who, being by me duly sworn, did say,
that he is the President of THE KEMMERER COAL COMPANY, and that
said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by
authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said
G. E. SORENSEN duly acknowledged to me that said corporation
executed the same and that the seal affixed is the seal of said
corporation.
0. F. Lorerui - Notary Public
tots of
Wyoming
A*. 14,1177

My Commission Expires:

^

J ^ / U J<r t.

Notary Public
"
TT
Residing at: Frontier, Wyoming

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Keith E. Taylor, PARSONS,
BEHLE & LATIMER, 185 South State Street} Suite 700, P.O. Box
11898, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 on tni/s /(pday of September,
1988.
3^r
Clartt B^/Allred"
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